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Modeling Adversarial Insider Vehicles in Mix Zones
Nicholas Plewtong
Security is a necessity when dealing with new forms of technology that may not have
been analyzed from a security perspective. One of the latest growing technological
advances are Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs). VANETs allow vehicles to
communicate information to each other wirelessly which allows for an increase in
safety and efficiency for vehicles. However, with this new type of computerized system
comes the need to maintain security on top of it.
In order to try to protect location privacy of the vehicles in the system, vehicles
change pseudonyms or identifiers at areas known as mix zones. This thesis implements
a model that characterizes the attack surface of an adversarial insider vehicle inside
of a VANET. This adversarial vehicle model describes the interactions and effects
that an attacker vehicle can have on mix zones in order to lower the overall location
privacy of the system and remain undetected to defenders in the network. In order to
reach the final simulation of the model, several underlying models had to be developed
around the interactions of defender and attacker vehicles.
The evaluation of this model shows that there are significant impacts that internal
attacker vehicles can have on location privacy within mix zones. From the created
simulations, the results show that having one to five optimal attackers shows a de-
crease of 0.6%-2.6% on the location privacy of the network and a 12% decrease in
potential location privacy in a mix zone where an attacker defects in a 50-node net-
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Over the last few years, there has been an increasing interest in developing more
technological advances in intelligent transportation systems. In particular, much re-
search has gone into Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) to improve efficiency
and safety of transportation by enabling vehicles to communicate between each other
[6][8][18]. The applications for VANETs range from safety systems, like collision
detection systems, to those that improve efficiency, such as platooning. The use
of VANETs will become in industry as the automotive industry develops fully au-
tonomous vehicles.
However, as we seek to create innovative applications for VANETs, the concern of
the implementation of security within these applications is worth heeding [15]. One of
the main security problems that exists in VANETs is maintaining a vehicle’s location
privacy [2][3][11][16]. Vehicle nodes differ from mobile and wifi nodes in the way that
they not only communicate with other vehicle nodes but also obtain sensor data about
their environment, obtain GPS data, and communicate these to both vehicle nodes
and roadside nodes [16]. These additional operations and the necessity to work in a
high speed environment produce complications in securing the network. An example
of this problem is that because the way vehicles broadcast their communications to
other vehicles and units, an adversary can eavesdrop on the messages sent from a
vehicle. This effectively allows for an adversary to track the location of a vehicle
overtime leading to the loss of privacy of that node.
One proposed approach is to combat an adversaries trying to track the location
of vehicles by pseudonym switching [12]. Instead of a vehicle using a single identifier
for the entire time, the vehicle will periodically change its pseudonym with other
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vehicles in order to mitigate an adversary’s tracking capabilities. These areas where
vehicles switch pseudonyms are known as mix zones [3]. When all vehicles cooperate
in a mix zone, then the location privacy of the system increases. However, in terms
of self-maintained location privacy, vehicle nodes may decide to not cooperate in self
interest since pseudonym changes are costly in terms of resources. If the costs of
cooperating in the mix zone outweigh the benefits of location privacy gained for the
node, the selfish node would choose to not cooperate. The high density of vehicles as
opposed to mobile nodes in a network make their interactions in mix zones significant
in maintaining location privacy.
Although previous models have developed on a system of selfish vehicle nodes that
act in the interest of maximizing their own location privacy, from security perspective,
there can be other type of vehicle nodes with different goals. In this work, I develop
a different type of vehicle node acting as a malicious adversary. The goal of the
malicious adversary is to minimize the location privacy of the entire system of nodes
rather than try to maximize its own location privacy. A core aspect of examining
this system of player in the vehicle system of nodes is to demonstrate the effect of
a malicious adversary often found in many different types of computer-controlled
environments.
1.1 Problems Within Current Models
While current models do examine the important aspect that involves vehicle nodes
acting in a selfish manner, it is important that the possibility of nodes with other
overall goals is taken into account [13]. If models are created without taking all
possibilities of node behaviors into account, then the models may not mimic what
behaviors could be found in real VANETs. When talking about a common vehicle
node’s goal, this corresponds to maintaining of an individual node’s security, which, in
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this case, is the node’s location privacy. In computer security environments, there are
usually adversaries that are a counterpart to the goals of the common user, achieving
malicious activity such as forcing denial of the services of a system or obtaining
secretive data from the system or users. VANETs are a type of computerized network
that requires security in order to protect vehicles in the network. Considering that
security is required in VANETs, it is possible to consider the goal of an adversary
in this type of system. One possible goal would be to lessen the overall security of
the network as a whole. This type of adversary has not to the best of the author’s
knowledge been considered.
1.2 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, I develop an in-depth model and evaluation of how an internal
attacker can affect location privacy of a system containing greedy nodes. This is
achieved by evaluating the interaction between defender nodes wanting to maximize
their own individual location privacy and attackers wanting to minimize the system’s
overall location privacy through cooperating or defecting in a mix zone.
The contribution of this thesis is to develop and evaluate a model for an internal
unknown attacker in a system of greedy vehicle nodes that has not been previously
developed. It expands on previous game theoretic mix zone papers to introduce a
new type of player as an attacker in the system. The final model shows results of
the attackers who not only want to accomplish lowering the location privacy of the
system but also wish to remain undetected.
The main contributions from the thesis are:
• Creation of a formal game model for the attack and defense scenario.
• Creation of a model for suspicion levels for defenders to identify potential at-
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tackers.
• In a particular 50-node network simulation, development of the optimal strategy
for an adversarial insider vehicle as a 37% defect rate.
• In a particular 50-node network simulation, calculation of a 0.6%-2.6% decrease
of location privacy by attackers overall on a network.
• In a particular 50-node network simulation, calculation of a 12% decrease of
potential location privacy in a mix zone where an attacker defects.
These results help show the effectiveness of this type of attacker in VANETs and thus
implies the needs for future research for defenses based on this type of attacker to be
modeled for VANETs.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
In chapter 2, the background of security, VANETs, pseudonym switching and
game theory are explained. In chapter 3, related works to the content of the thesis are
discussed. In chapter 4, the design of the attack and defend model are evaluated. In
chapter 5, the implementation of the model and results of the models and simulations
are described in detail. In chapter 6, significant findings from our results are discussed.
In chapter 7, future work that could be expand from the results of the thesis further




In order to accurately start creating an internal adversarial model for pseudonym
switching in VANETs, this background chapter describes the technical terms related
to security, VANETs, pseudonym switching, and game theory. This background
provides basic concepts at a general level to better understand subsequent application
and contribution of the model.
2.1 Security
Security is the main focus this thesis contributes to. When technological advances
develop in computer systems, security is often the last aspect to be considered in
comparison to functionality of the system. Yet, if security of a system is not properly
maintained, the system’s functionality as a whole is threatened to collapse due to
possible damage and attacks. As a result, it is important to maintain proper security
as well as functionality for a service to work properly.
Security is a mechanism that protects computer systems from attacked while
maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. When any of
these aspects is compromised and fails to be properly maintained, the security of the
system as a whole is jeopardized. It requires all three aspects to be upheld at all
times.
2.1.1 Confidentiality and Privacy
Confidentiality is defined as making sure that information and data does not end
up in the hands of unauthorized individuals. This means that to protect confidential-
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ity, there must be defenses and countermeasures to ensure that data and information
is only seen by those authorized to access. This is the aspect that will be most focused
on when talking about how to secure VANETs.
One of the main problems in VANETs that threatens the security of the system
is the possibility of tracking a location of a vehicle over time. When speaking in
terms of confidentiality and location tracking, a vehicle’s location over time is confi-
dential information that should only be available to the corresponding vehicle itself.
If an unauthorized entity were to be able track another vehicle’s location, this breaks
the confidentiality and privacy of the vehicle and thus threatens the security of the
VANET [9]. Security researchers want to make sure that attack vectors on confiden-
tiality are properly modeled in order to adequately model the defenses necessary to
develop to prevent fruitful attacks.
2.1.2 Vulnerabilities
Another concept that pertains to the security of VANETs is the concept of vul-
nerabilities. A vulnerability is where there exists a weaknesses in the system that
enables an attacker to exploit them. In terms of VANETs, attackers seek vulnerabil-
ities in the system in order to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the network.
Since VANETs rely heavily on communications to exchange information between
nodes in the network, attackers specifically look for vulnerabilities within the process
of the vehicles communicating. This can vary from trying to access information from
the communication, modify information being transferred between nodes or even un-
derstanding the flaws in the defenses implemented in other attacks. Overall, to under-
stand how to protect the system, research needs to be conducted on what weaknesses
currently exist on the network so that appropriate defenses can be implemented.
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2.2 Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
This section talks about concept of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) in
order to understand the system that needs to be secured. Vehicular networks are
an expansion of a mobile ad hoc network which is a type of network in which the
nodes move around and change its locations [7]. Along with this, each node in the
network is able to communicate wirelessly with other nodes in the network to transmit
information. For VANETs in particular, each node specifically represents a vehicle
in the system, which can communicate wireless with other vehicles that exist in the
network.
One of the emerging research areas in which VANETs research has been focused
on is the concept of autonomous vehicles. With a shift in the capabilities of tech-
nology and computer systems growing over the last decade, automotive companies
are moving away from human driven vehicles where the human driver is in complete
control of all actions of the vehicle to computerized vehicles. With the push towards
fully autonomous vehicles, VANETs research has pushed towards other autonomous
applications within vehicles being developed.
2.2.1 Communication Model
For vehicle nodes in a VANET, vehicles are able to communicate to other vehi-
cles and roadside infrastructure through different types of computerized systems on
board the vehicle. The primary communication system used by the vehicles is ded-
icated short-range communication (DSRC). This type of communication is used to
transmit data quickly between vehicles in order to facilitate the process of the data for
applications [8]. DSRC has been developed for securing message authentication and
privacy while also making sure that the moving vehicles in the network are able to
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identify each other and transmit messages quickly and accurately. It also attempts to
mitigate the effect of extra noise throughout the network caused by outside broadcasts
and weather conditions.
One the main security concerns involving DSRC stems from the broadcasting
nature of the communication. Because vehicles broadcast their information and data
for other vehicles in the network to use, attackers can attempt to obtain this data by
eavesdropping on the network through using listening nodes [11]. These eavesdropping
nodes can be placed all along the route of the network in order to obtain information
about the vehicles at different points of time. Because of this, a vehicle’s privacy
is threatened if an attacker is able to obtain identifying information by tracking a
vehicle along the route it is taking.
2.2.2 Applications inside VANETs
The innovation and research that has gone into VANETs has led to vast improve-
ments in the capabilities for safety and efficiency for vehicles. Since vehicles can use
DSRC and other sensor equipment to obtain data on the current environment and
transfer that information around the network, vehicles can process that data to use
for cooperation processes. Platooning is a driver assisting technology that allows ve-
hicles in a system to speed up and slow down in synchronization with other vehicles
while maintaining safe spacing between the vehicles [8]. Other benefits to the safety
and efficiency of vehicles via having computerized systems from VANETs are collision
avoidance, lane keep assistance and traffic optimization [17].
All of these improvements are a result of the innovation in the field of VANETs.
Yet, there has not been adequate research in the security involved in securing these
processes. Security is usually the last thing in mind in these researches when it comes
to developing the processes. That’s why security research needs to be improved while
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these processes are being developed because of the critical nature of VANETs. It is
necessary to secure attacks against the system that could ultimately affect the lives
of drivers and passengers. If an attack affects a vehicle’s broadcast to other vehicles
about speed or location, that could lead to misleading decisions by the vehicle’s
computer system.
2.3 Pseudonym Switching
The protection of the location privacy, the ability to prevent others from learning
one’s current or past location [4]. of users is important in VANETs. When vehicles
share information via communication channels, they have a unique identifier that
allows other vehicles in the system to identify which vehicle the data is coming from.
However, if this identifier were to remain constant, other outside users may be able
to de-anonymize users based on broadcasted messages corresponding to the constant
identifier. In terms of location privacy, if an adversary were to detect that the same
identifier was being broadcasted along a route, the adversary would essentially be able
to track the vehicle’s location and path over a period of time. This loss of privacy is
something that needs to be prevented in the way VANETs communicate.
2.3.1 Mix Zones
Because of the troubles brought by a constant identifier in broadcasts, researchers
have created a new solution where users mix or switch their identifiers in a temporary
zone known as a mix zone. The result afterwards is that vehicles are now communi-
cating with a different identifier than their previous one [2]. This changing identifier
is known as a pseudonym. When a vehicle is manufactured, the vehicle contains a set
of pseudonyms from which it can switch from.
The general model of a mix zone is as follows [3]:
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1. There is a trusted middleware system for the users.
2. Users enter regions known as the mix zone where location can not be tracked.
3. When users decide to cooperate in a mix zone to switch identifiers, the users’
identifiers are switched along with all other cooperating users in the zone.
4. When users exit the mix zone region, they can resume communication with
their new pseudonym.
The goal of the mix zone is to prevent long term tracking users’ location but still allow-
ing an individual short term location application to work. The internal trusted system
is able to correlate the pseudonyms to the correct user identity while non-trusted users
are able to see the changing pseudonyms that are broadcasted in messages.
2.3.2 Effectiveness of Pseudonym Changing Schemes
One of the key areas of research when it comes to pseudonyms is the effectiveness
of the changing scheme. In many cases, this is evaluated by how likely is an adversary
able to connect changes in pseudonyms to a corresponding user. If an attacker is able
to identify the connection, then the pseudonym changing scheme is not secure. While
the specifics on the type of pseudonym-changing scheme is not the focus of this thesis,
many past papers have evaluated different types of schemes and their effectiveness.
One of the important concepts that will be considered in this thesis is the concept
of level of privacy gained. This considers how much location privacy an individual
user gains from entering and exiting a mix zone. It is important to have a secure
pseudonym changing-scheme in order to further evaluate the severity of other attack
threat models that could effect the location privacy of the system.
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2.4 Game Theory
Mix zones provide a huge benefit in protecting the location privacy of a system
of vehicle nodes when all the nodes cooperate in switching pseudonyms when they
enter the mix zones. The flaw in this is that the system is often analyzed only under
the assumption that nodes always cooperate. There is, however, rational reasoning
for a vehicle to not cooperate and instead defect from switching pseudonyms. This
conflicting idea of cooperation versus non-cooperation is the reason why researchers
have started to model the interactions in mix zones through game theory.
Game theory is a study of mathematics that deals with modeling interactions of
players who make decisions that affect other players in the system. Each player has to
consider other players’ strategies in order to analyze what their own strategy should
be. Game theory contributes a different perspective on how to model the concept
of mix zones. Each vehicle in the system now has to analyze whether or not other
vehicles will cooperate in switching pseudonyms in order to determine whether or not
it should decide to switch. Although this thesis does not go into specific mathematical
proofs of game theory, it does apply key aspects of game theory into the consideration
of modeling how an attacker would interact with a group of selfish vehicle nodes and
show the effect of the attacker’s interactions. The following terms are key concepts
from game theory that are considered throughout this thesis.
2.4.1 Players
Players of a game are essentially a decision maker in a game. Players of the same
type will be modeled in the same way in terms of possible strategies and payoffs
gained. The number of players in a game is not bound and provide the basis of what
strategies and payoffs need to be defined in a game.
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In terms of mix zones, players are individual vehicles that exist in the system.
These vehicles will have a defined strategy model and payoffs that they can gain in
the game which is the interaction in the mix zone. Different types of vehicles as
players can be defined and discussed later in this thesis.
2.4.2 Strategy
Strategy is one of the basic concepts that exist in game theory when describing a
game. It is the one of the options from which a player is able to choose. This strategy
not only affects the result for that player, but also affects the results for all the other
players in the game. Another property of strategy for game theory is that it defines
what decision a player will make given the situation they are in. This is known as a
pure strategy concept. There can be probabilities assigned to when a player will use
each pure strategy known as a mixed strategy concept.
In terms of mix zones, strategies will play a part in defining what decisions vehicles
in the system can make. A vehicle’s chosen strategy will affect how other vehicles in
the systems decide to choose their own strategy.
2.4.3 Payoffs
Payoffs in game theory are known as a numerical value that a player obtains
depending on what decisions were made by all players in the game. The model
of payoffs is usually seen as a value that players wish to maximize as it represents
the profit gained from making a particular decision. These payoffs coincide with a
player’s strategy, as a player will make a decision based on how they can maximize
their payout in a game.
In the VANETs model and with the goal for security, the payout that vehicle
nodes in the network will want to maximize the payoff of their own individual location
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privacy. This payoff is calculated by what is gained following an exchange inside a
mix zone. When a new type of adversary vehicle is introduced into the system, a new
payoff will have to be defined for that type of attacker.
2.4.4 Nash Equilibrium
Nash equilibrium in a game represents a state of a game where players can no
longer gain anything by changing their strategy based on the equilibrium of other
players in the system. Players in the game have reached a Nash equilibrium if no
single player can increase their payoff if they were given the advantage of knowing
the strategies of all other players in advance. The Nash equilibrium consists of the
optimal strategies for each player and the payoffs received for those optimal strategies.
In mix zones, vehicles in the system will gravitate towards a state of equilibrium.
Vehicles will make the optimal decisions based on other vehicle’s portrayal of optimal
decisions in order to maximize the payoff they receive. Eventually, all the vehicles
will be in a scenario where they cannot optimize their goal of maximizing location
privacy any further. Later in the thesis when the attacking vehicles are introduced,





Pseudonym switching and mix zones have been a recently developing concept
within the field of VANETs with significant research going into both the security
of the actual method of performing pseudonym switching and analysis of the effects
of mix zones. Past works laid a foundation where problems and solutions exist for
the topics were identified while shining the light as to what future research is neces-
sary to advance security in VANETs. The following research has been outlined with
important aspects towards the development of the content of my research.
3.1 Survey on Pseudonyms Changing Strategies for VANETs
This survey [3] evaluates and compares the different pseudonym changing ap-
proaches that exist for VANETs. Along with this, it also develops a discussion on
the problems and challenges that exist within pseudonym changing strategies. The
survey is one of the first to analyze this topic and start to push towards what is
necessary for future research.
Some of the important topics analyzed throughout the survey that are particularly
relevant to the contents of this thesis are:
• Metrics used to evaluate privacy
• The concept of an adversary model
• Costs involved in changing a pseudonym
• The existence of non cooperative behavior
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The survey provides an introduction to the current research in these topics and lays
the foundation for the advancement of future research.
In order to have a measure of effectiveness of pseudonym switching, there needs to
exist a way to quantify and qualify the privacy in the system. Some of the most used
metrics mentioned in the survey are anonymity set size, the entropy of the anonymity
set size, the adversary’s success rate, the maximum tracking time, and statistics on
pseudonym changes. Incorporating these types of data allow one to be able to start
identifying when the interaction of pseudonym switching is working given a particular
model and when the expected level of privacy is not being maintained.
The survey also describes the use of an adversary model in a VANET system,
where attacks may exist in order to try diminishing privacy in the system. It dis-
tinguishes different types of adversaries ranging from being global or local, active or
passive, and internal or external. One of the main types of adversaries described is
the location privacy adversary which tracks vehicle nodes by eavesdropping on the
communications regarding those particular nodes.
The demonstration that there are costs involved when dealing with changing a
pseudonym provides a concept that pseudonym changing is not a method providing
full benefit. Some of the costs of conducting a pseudonym change are impact on the
road safety depending on the type of strategy used, overhead costs necessary to carry
out the pseudonym change, and possible loss of accountability of using a particular
strategy.
A non cooperative behavior is developed from the costs involved in a particular
strategy. Because cooperation between vehicle nodes plays a large role on how suc-
cessful a pseudonym changing strategy is, it is important to recognize that there may
not always be complete cooperation between all the nodes at a given time. This gives
an introduction into using game theory as a means to calculate the gained benefit
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versus the costs for a particular node given a particular scenario in order to arrive at
a node’s decision of whether or not to cooperate.
3.2 Analyzing Attacks and Defences for Security in VANETs
This paper [10] focuses at creating a comprehensive security analysis for VANETs
due to the increase in security and privacy problems occurring since the development
of VANETs. One of the key aspects explains that previous studies fail to examine
the attackers’ and defenders’ costs and gains when modeling which leads to misinter-
pretation of the interaction between the attackers and defenders. The authors give a
overall overview of different types of attacks and defenses that currently exist in the
VANET environment
One of the important considerations that this paper makes is introducing the
concepts of Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Attack (ROA). The Return
on Investment for the defense comprises annual expected loss, risk mitigation and
cost of investment. The Return on Attack comprises the expected gain on attack and
cost of the attack used to calculate how much an attacker could expect to gain from
acting on a specific attack. The Return on Attack becomes an important attribute in
how future research on adversaries on the privacy of VANETs is analyzed in order to
determine when an attacker could choose to carry out an attack in order to maximize
the potential privacy loss in the system.
3.3 Understanding Non-Cooperative Behavior using Game Theoretic
Models for Location Privacy
One of the important aspects developed throughout this thesis is the concept
that vehicle nodes can be modeled with non-cooperative behavior rather than with
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fully cooperative behavior. In this paper [11], the authors describe that in terms
of changing pseudonyms in mix zones, vehicle nodes act with non-cooperative be-
havior. Unlike previous models examining the effects on location privacy under the
assumption that nodes that enter a mix zone will always cooperate with each other
by switching pseudonyms, the paper develops the concept of a non-cooperative model
for the nodes.
The non-cooperative properties for the nodes result from the properties that real-
ize that changing pseudonyms in a mix zone can cost a significant amount of resources
for a node. Therefore, due to such cost, nodes develop selfish behavior where they can
choose not to cooperate in switching pseudonyms if the cost of changing is greater
than the location privacy that would be gained for that node. This develops into the
need for a way to model the result of how vehicle nodes would interact with each
other given that all nodes are acting selfishly.
The paper applies game theory concepts in order to model the actions of selfish
nodes, where the goal of each individual node is to maximize its own location pri-
vacy while minimizing the cost. One of the main developments used for the game
theoretic model is a model of user-centric location privacy implemented to determine
a node’s location privacy over time. Using this model along with a location privacy
loss function presented in the paper, the authors develop the payoff for a selfish node
to be used the game theory model. Incorporating the concepts of equilibrium in
game theory, the authors develop the optimal strategies for a selfish node for different
types of games where a node could not gain any more location privacy from changing
strategies. The authors examine this over 2-player games and n-player games along
with complete and incomplete information games and present models for each type
of game.
The paper leaves room for expanding on the model presented especially when
17
looking from a security standpoint. As the type of player presented in the non-
cooperative model is that of a selfish vehicle node, taking a security perspective
presents opportunities for introducing new types of players to the model which can
more realistically replicate other types of players that may exist in real-life scenarios
of VANETs. These new players could drastically change the resulting strategies
presented in the games themselves.
3.4 Adversarial Presence in Mix Zones through Eavesdropping
This paper [13] investigates how mobile nodes can use mix zones to protect their
location privacy in relation to when faced with an adversary. The aim of an adversary
in the presented model is to track the location of the nodes overtime which in turn
decreases the location privacy of the collective nodes. The authors use a game theo-
retic model to describe the interactions between the adversary and defending nodes
with different strategies for each type of the different players. In order to accomplish
the goal of the adversary, the adversary can use eavesdropping stations in order to
attempt to track the nodes.
In terms of game theoretic concepts, the authors examine both complete and
incomplete information games in terms of a small scale and large scale model of in-
teractions. Analyzing the games at the small scale of one individual intersection in
the network, the authors discover the single Bayesian Nash equilibrium at one inter-
section. Using this, they expand it to a large scale model of numerous intersections
in a network before developing an algorithm to obtain the equilibrium over the larger
network. This examination of the interactions on both a micro and macro scale is an
important concept in examining how to expand the analysis of VANETs.
This paper successfully introduces the concept of having a malicious adversary in
a particular technological environment of mix zones in VANETs. Often past research
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only examine the use case of inherent users of the system which in this scenario are
mobile nodes acting in the mix zones. The inclusion of an adversary trying to elimi-
nate the goal of the inherent users of the system encompasses the concept of security
in computer systems. It introduces a means to connect the attackers and defenders in
a system and further moves into solving the problem on how researchers can prevent
attackers from successfully given the interactions between the attackers and defend-
ers. Along with this, the discovery of how the lack of knowledge of the mobile nodes
of the attacker and the attacker’s strategy leading to a decrease in location privacy
shows the potential effects of an attacker’s effect on decreasing location privacy in a
system.
3.5 Modeling an Attacking Vehicle Inside the VANET
Though many types of attacks on the privacy of VANETs focus on obtaining
tracking information from outside of the vehicle node system, this particular paper
[19] works a out a model that describes what happens when an attacker node is
included inside the collection of defender vehicles inside a VANET. This particular
model describes the interactions of an N + 1 vehicle node system, where there exists
N defender vehicles and one malicious vehicle in the system.
The difference demonstrated by using this type of model allows the attacking
vehicle to effect the system on an internal level, where the attacker is a vehicle within
the system. The security implications of this type of model show a demonstration of a
new type of threat modeling for VANETs. It brings the question of how adequate are
the defenses previously modeled work against a possibly unknown attacker inside the
system. This pushes forward necessary future research towards how defending vehicles
could attempt to detect an anomaly inside the system and whether the network has
been compromised by an adversary.
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Although the paper goes into more in-depth mathematical explanation of the game
developed from the N + 1 node model, the basis of model from a security perspective




In this chapter, I describe the design of the model for the interaction of greedy
vehicle nodes with the inclusion of internal attacker vehicle nodes. I focus on describ-
ing the overall goals and requirements of the model in order to accurately portray
the results that would occur when applied to a real VANET system. In chapter 5, I
explore a detailed implementation of this model.
4.1 Goals
The primary goal in creating the model is to demonstrate the effects of adding
byzantine attackers to a system of greedy vehicle nodes [14]. This will be used to
help build on the severity and impact that internal attackers can have on mix zones
and allow future research to determine how to implement defenses to further secure
mix zones from potential malicious adversaries.
4.2 Requirements
In this section, I define the necessary system requirements in order to accurately
model what would be seen in actual interactions in a mix zone.
The following are the formal requirements that the mix zone model will maintain:
• My model must support scalability of the number of vehicles that can be in the
network.
• My model must support dynamic changing of the amount of attacker vehicles
currently in the system.
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• My model must be able to quantitatively maintain the location privacy levels
of the defending vehicles in the system
4.2.1 Scalability
The scalability of the number of vehicles in the network is critical in order to help
model real life scenarios of the number of vehicles that exist in a VANET. When
talking about roads and freeways, the amount of vehicles clustered together are in
the hundreds and thousands with groups of vehicles all being in the same VANET.
Because of this, large scaling of the number of vehicles and their interactions in the
model will help mimic the potential size of VANETs.
4.2.2 Numerous Attackers
Another important requirement to consider in the model is that there is not only
one single adversary trying to attack the system at a time. When talking about a
standard computer network, there are often numerous attackers trying to infiltrate
the network at the same time in order to maximize the severity of the effect of the
attacks on the network. This observation can also transfer over on VANETs. In order
to make sure that defenses can be created based on the potential of attackers, the
model needs uphold the potential for multiple attackers that may exist in the system
at a time.
4.2.3 Quantitative Location Privacy
In order to be able to determine what effect attackers have on the system, the
model need to sufficiently track the decrease in location privacy of the system. The
model must keep track of the current location privacy for each vehicle in the system,
specifically the defending nodes in the system. By maintaining the location privacy
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levels, the model will be able to summate the system’s location privacy after exiting
a mix zone and determine how much the attackers have affected the network.
4.3 Mix Zone Model
The modeling of the mix zone is the basis for evaluating the interactions between
vehicles in the network. The following is the process for vehicles follow for one instance
of entering and exiting a mix zone.
1. There are n vehicles that enter the mix zone.
2. After the vehicles enter, each vehicle makes a decision whether or not it wants
to cooperate in switching pseudonyms or defect in switching pseudonyms.
3. The vehicles that do decide to cooperate switch pseudonyms along with all other
cooperating vehicles.
4. The vehicles that defect take no action in the mix zone.
5. After this process, the vehicles exit the mix zone.
Figure 4.1 shows an overview of this process for a 20 node network (a) where 10
nodes entering a mix zone (b) and out of the those 10 nodes in the mix zone, 7 of the
nodes decide to cooperate with each other and 3 of the nodes decide to defect (c).
There are a list of rules and assumptions that are associated with the model
regarding mix zones. To summarize the process with the rules and assumptions stated
above, the following algorithm is created for how a vehicle decides to cooperate or
defect in a mix zone:
1. When a vehicle enters a mix zone, it observes the number of vehicles in the mix
zone and its current location privacy
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Figure 4.1: Model for Process of a Mix Zone for a 20 Vehicle Node Network
2. It formulates the potential gain in location privacy based on those values and
a predictive model independently of other vehicles’ decision.
3. It decides whether or not to cooperate in the mix zone based on the calculated
value.
4. After the vehicle exits, it observes how many vehicles decided to cooperate to
calculate deviation for suspicion.
4.4 Location Privacy Model for the Mix Zone
One of the key aspects for modeling the mix zone is how the location privacy gained
is determined. In previous research [11], there has been a mathematical formula
defined to quantitatively determine the location privacy that will be gained in a mix
zone.
That formula is:
LP = log2 n (4.1)
where
n ≥ 2 (4.2)
LP represents the location privacy of the cooperating vehicle nodes after the mix
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zone and n represents the number of vehicle nodes that cooperated in the mix zone.
One of the key concepts that comes from the formula (4.1) is that there is an
upper bound on the maximum amount of location privacy a node can have in the
network. This is bound by the maximum value of n or the number of vehicle nodes
in the network. The condition (4.2) represents that in order for pseudonym switching
to take place in a mix zone, there must be at least two nodes in the mix zone since
that is the minimum for nodes to be able to switch with each other.
An example of this formula with a 50-vehicle node network is shown in Figure 4.2.
The upper bound of location privacy for a node in a 50-node system is approximately
5.64. As a result, the location privacy of any node in the network at any given time
is between 0 and 5.64.
Figure 4.2: Location Privacy of a Node After Mix Zone in a 50 Vehicle
Node Network
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4.5 Location Privacy Loss Function
Another important aspect of the design of the model is the property of location
privacy being lost over time. When nodes do not switch their pseudonyms, they
become more susceptible to being location tracked. This is because their identifier
remains constant and thus becomes easier for outside adversary to connect a vehicle
to its broadcasts. Because of this, the model needs some way of modeling a loss in
location privacy as time goes by where a vehicle doesn’t cooperate in pseudonym
switching. In this model, the loss in location privacy is modeled as a constant linear
decrease. This means that for each instance of a mix zone, regardless of whether or
not a node in the network enter the mix zone, cooperate or defects, there is a constant
loss in location privacy. Since the location privacy of a node must be at least zero,
if a node never switches pseudonyms, the minimum location privacy it will have will
be at least zero. The model incorporates this function to force nodes to eventually
switch pseudonyms if they want to maintain a high level of location privacy.
The location privacy loss function is:
LPLT = x ∗ t (4.3)
where LPLT is the location privacy loss over time, x is a constant for location privacy
loss and t represents the time that has past or in this particular case, the number of
rounds that have past. From this, the formula (4.3) summarizes that between each
round of a mix zone, there is a constant loss in location privacy for a vehicle.
4.6 Vehicle Types for the Mix Zone
In our model, there exist two different types of vehicles that can be in the network
for mix zones. The first type is the defender node. These nodes represent the vehicles
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that are trying to maintain their own location privacy in the network in order to
maintain security. The second is the attacker nodes which represents the new type
of vehicle that did not exist in the previous models. They are trying to lower the
location privacy of the overall system and harm the security of the defender nodes.
These vehicle types represent the concept of different types of players in our model of
mix zones. The following parts provide an in-depth analysis of each type of vehicle
in the model.
4.6.1 Defender Vehicles
The defender vehicles represent normal user vehicles in the network. These ve-
hicles represent the maintenance of location privacy in the network. Ultimately,
attackers are trying to affect the location privacy of the defender nodes in order to
achieve their goal.
The following represent the overall goal of an individual defender node in the
model:
• A defender vehicle wants to maximize its own individual location privacy in the
network
• For a defender vehicle, the location privacy of other defender vehicles in the
network or the location privacy of the network as a whole is insignificant.
The concept of the defender node describes that the nodes act selfishly in a mix zone.
If there is no potential gain in location privacy for a defender for cooperating in a
mix zone, then a selfish defender will not cooperate. Because all defender vehicles in
the model are all selfish, then no defender cares about the overall location privacy of
the network.
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The following assumptions is also made in terms of the knowledge of defender
vehicles:
• The defender assumes that all vehicles in the network are also acting as defender
nodes.
• A defender maintains a certain level of suspicion based on the deviation of the
predicted cooperation probability.
• A defender has no knowledge of the existence of any attacker vehicles in the
network unless raised by suspicion.
These assumptions are necessary into creating a model relevant to how adversaries act
in computerized systems. Often, attackers will make sure they remain undetected in
a system. In order to start with the basis of the model, the assumption for defenders
to assume that the network only consists of greedy vehicle nodes is used.
4.6.2 Attacker Vehicles
The attacker vehicles represent the adversarial vehicles in the network. These
vehicles represent the possibility of malicious actions to tamper with the location
privacy of a VANET.
The following represent the overall goal of an individual attack node in the model:
• An attacker vehicle wants to maximize the location privacy loss of the defender
vehicles in the network.
• An attacker vehicle wants to avoid being detected by the defender vehicles.
This goal of the attacker vehicles in the model represents what malicious adversaries
work for when dealing with computerized systems. Since the defender nodes want to
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maintain their own location privacy in order to sustain their security, attackers wish
to threaten the security of the network by lowering the overall location privacy of the
network. By lowering the location privacy, the network becomes more susceptible to
location tracking by other types of attacks on the VANET. This leads to the benefit of
having this type of internal attacker vehicle within the network. An internal attacker
vehicle that can lower location privacy benefits chaining that attack to other outside
attackers on the network.
4.7 Strategies
As mentioned earlier, there exist two different strategies that vehicles can decide
on inside the mix zone. Each vehicle can decide between two different strategies:
• Cooperate: Vehicle decides to switch pseudonyms
• Defect: Vehicle decides not to switch pseudonyms
These strategies apply to both defender and attacker vehicles. However, the benefit
of each strategy is dependent on the type of vehicle. The next section describe the
reasoning why a vehicle would decide a certain strategy given a particular situation
in a mix zone.
4.7.1 Defender Strategies
A defender would choose to cooperate in the case that it would be able to in-
crease its current location privacy through cooperating. However, the location pri-
vacy gained after cooperating in a mix zone depends on the number of cooperating
nodes and that a defender node does not know how many nodes will cooperate be-
fore choosing a strategy. Because of this, a defender node has to predict how many
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nodes in the mix zone will decide to cooperate. If the defender predicts that it would
gain location privacy through cooperating based on a predicted amount of cooperated
nodes, then the defender will decide to cooperate.
A defender would in turn decide to defect in the case when it could not gain
any location privacy through cooperating. When a defender decides to defect, it
only cares about the value the decision is bringing to itself. However, the decision it
makes affects the amount of location privacy gained from the other nodes that decide
to cooperate. Since a defender chooses a strategy based on a predicted number
of cooperating nodes, if the actual number of cooperating nodes is lower than the
expected number of cooperating nodes, then the cooperating nodes might gain less
location privacy than expected.
Since all defender nodes are following the same goal of maximizing their own
location privacy, any deterrence to that goal is important to the defender. The
defender nodes all follow the same model of prediction cooperating nodes. This
means that if the VANET truly exists of only selfish defender vehicle nodes, then
there should be little deviation from the prediction model. This property will be
expanded in a later section.
The equation for a defender’s strategy is a mixed strategy equation:
Sdefx,y = (p, 1− p) (4.4)
where x is the strategy where the defender cooperates which is played with probability




An attacker would choose to cooperate in the case when it wants to avoid being
detected by other defender nodes. Even though cooperating means that the amount
of location privacy gained for the cooperating defender nodes would increase, the
priority of not being detected may cause an attacker to decide to cooperate. Another
cause of decision for an attacker to cooperate is that the number of nodes entering
the mix zone is low. Since an attacker wants to maximize the location privacy loss in
a system, it wants to affect the highest of defender nodes when it chooses a strategy.
Therefore, cooperating when a low amount of nodes are in a mix zone will provide a
lower benefit for defender nodes than cooperating when a high amount of nodes are
in a mix zone.
An attacker would choose to defect in order to lower the location privacy gained by
cooperating defender nodes. As explained by the location privacy model from coop-
eration in a mix zone, the greater the number of cooperating nodes is, the greater the
location privacy gained from the mix zone is for each cooperating defender. Therefore,
when an attacker decides to defect in a mix zone, it is taking away potential location
privacy gained for cooperating defender nodes by a potential of one additional node.
However, because defender nodes are predicting a certain amount of cooperation, any
deviation of an attacker’s choice in strategy from that of a selfish defender node can
raise suspicion that there is an anomaly in the network.
Attackers have to mix the choice of strategy in a mix zone in order maximize the
privacy loss while remaining undetected. This mix in strategy for the attacker is what
the model will help determine. The equation for an attacker’s strategy is a mixed
strategy equation:
Sattx,y = (q, 1− q) (4.5)
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where x is the strategy where the defender cooperates which is played with probability
q and y is the strategy where the defender defects which is played with probability
1− q.
4.8 Payoffs of Vehicles
With all information about the goals of each type of vehicles and modeling how
location privacy is obtained throughout the system, the model for payoffs takes into
consideration these values. Since the defender and the attacker nodes have different
overall goals, the payoffs for each consider different attributes of the model.
4.8.1 Defender Payoff
When talking about the payoff of a selfish defender vehicle node in the network,
the model will examine if there is an overall benefit to the defender in increasing
its location privacy from its current state. There are three main aspects to consider
which will determine a defender’s payoff from deciding to cooperate in a mix zone.
They are:
• The location privacy gained from cooperating with the actual number of coop-
erating nodes.
• The current location privacy of the defender node.
• The cost it takes to change a pseudonym.
There exist certain costs when changing pseudonyms. This includes the cost of
acquiring new pseudonyms, the cost of updating the routing tables of the middleware
during the switch, and the cost of remaining silent while inside a mix zone [11]. They
combine into a singular cost which can be demonstrated as a loss in location privacy.
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These aspects will be used to decide whether or not a defender should cooperate or
defect.
Another consideration in this payoff model is that the defenders do not know in
advance how many actual nodes will cooperate in the mix zone. Since they can only
estimate the number of nodes that will cooperate, this brings a new issue where even
if a defender node chooses a strategy based on an expected payoff, they may receive a
payoff that was less or greater than expected. This uncertainty comes into play when
talking about the level of suspicion defenders may confront.
For the defender payoff, it is defined as follows:
ELPG = ELPafter − LPbefore − Pc (4.6)
where ELPG represents the expected location privacy gained for a node, ELPafter
represents the expected location privacy of the node after the mix zone assuming
cooperation, LPbefore represents the location privacy of the node before the mix zone,
Pc represents the cost of a pseudonym change.
The evaluation of the formula (4.6) determines whether defender vehicle will de-
cide to cooperate or defect for the defender’s strategy. The rules for determining the
evaluation are as follows:
• If ELPG > 0, then the defender vehicle chooses to the strategy to cooperate
• If ELPG < 0, then the defender vehicle chooses to the strategy to defect
4.8.2 Attacker Payoff
To describe the payoff of an attacker, the consideration takes into account the
overall goal of the attacker to maximize the amount of privacy loss gained by the
defender vehicle nodes in the system. In order to account for this, the payoff is
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a difference between location privacy when the attacker vehicle cooperated versus
when the attacker vehicle defected. This difference is summed over all the cooperating
defender nodes that have been affected by the attacker’s strategy. For an attacker
that defects, this value will provide a positive payoff for the attacker. If the attacker
cooperates, the model will receive a zero payoff based on not causing any location
privacy loss.
The question that forms out of this payoff model is why would an attacker ever
cooperate if they would always receive a positive payoff. This is where the attacker’s
second goal of not being detected comes into the payoff model. Being detected in the
network is the downfall for the attacker and that’s why the attacker can not always
defect as to not raise suspicion.
For the attacker payoff, it is defined as follows:
TLPL = (n− a) ∗ (LPn − LPn−a)−D (4.7)
where TLPL represents the total location privacy lost for all cooperating defenders
in the mix zone, n represents the number of nodes (all defenders and attackers) in the
mix zone, a represents the number of attacker nodes that defect in the mix zone, LPn
and LPn−a represents the location privacy that would have been gained if there are n
and n− a cooperating defender nodes respectively, and D is a value representing the
level of possible detection the adversary is currently facing. The value of the level of
suspicion of defenders for detection is described in a later section.
4.9 Expected Probability of Cooperation Function
As mentioned above, the defender nodes have an expected number of nodes that
cooperate that they use in order to predict the expected payoff. For this, the model
needs a way to model the expected probability of cooperation with a function. The
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requirements for the function should match that of a probabilistic function. These
are the requirements that the function has:
• The function should output a value between 0 and 1 inclusively.
• The function takes into account that nodes are more likely to cooperate if the
number of nodes in the mix zone is close to the total number of nodes in the
VANET.
Taking these requirements in the function, the expected probability of cooperation
is modeled as followed:
EPC = log2 n/ log2m (4.8)
where
n ≥ 1 (4.9)
and
m ≥ n (4.10)
EPC represents the expected probability of cooperation of the nodes in the sys-
tem, n represents the number of vehicle nodes that are in the mix zone, and m
represents the total number of vehicle nodes in the VANET. The condition (4.9)
needs to be satisfied as there needs be at least one node to predict cooperation. The
condition (4.10) shows that the amount of nodes that join the mix zone cannot exceed
the number of nodes in the VANET.
An example of the expected probability of cooperation function with a 50-vehicle
node network is shown in Figure 4.3. As seen, the higher number of nodes that
enter a mix zone results in a very high probability for each node to cooperate with
all 50 nodes in the mix zone representing a 100 percent expected cooperation rate
where when 2 nodes joining a mix zone out of the 50 total nodes, only a 17 percent
cooperation rate is expected.
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Figure 4.3: Expected Probability of Cooperation of Nodes in a 50 Vehicle
Node Network
4.10 Level of Suspicion
The last aspect of defenders that the model needs to consider is how the defenders
will attempt to detect if there is an anomaly in the network. The way the model
considers this is by detecting if there is a larger than normal deviation from the
expected probability of cooperation. If an attacker were to defect an abnormal amount
more than that of a selfish defender node, then the deviation would become larger.
At some point, defender nodes would consider a deviation over a certain amount to be
suspicious and thus detect attackers in the system. Because deviation data from one
instance of a mix zone is not accurate, the average deviation over multiple iterations
of mix zone instances can be taken. The value at which defenders detect attackers
depends on how suspicious the defenders are in the system.
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4.11 System Summary with Formal Game Model
The formal game for the design is defined as G which is defined as a triplet
(P, T, S, U) [11], where P is the set of players, T is the set of types of players, S is the
set of strategies, and U is the set of payoffs. P consists of n vehicles in the network,
where each vehicle in n is either defined as an element in T : either a defender or
an attacker. S consists of two different strategies that each player can choose from:
cooperate or defect.
The following figure 4.4 shows a formal game model for the payouts of both types
of players for a two player game. However, the difference in the figure from the
formal game model is that the figure only shows the interactions of two players of
one defender and one attacker. In the formal model, there are n players where each
player’s strategy in the game determines the payoff for all the other players. Given
equations 4.3, 4.6 and 4.7, I develop a basis for a formal game model for the attack
and defense scenario for the interactions that occur in a mix zone.
Figure 4.4: Formal Game Model for Defenders and Attackers. 2-player
Game with Cooperate and Defect Strategies for Both Attackers and De-




This chapter explains the implementation and results for the design of the model
that was described previously. The explanation goes through the process of multiple
models that leads up to the final model of the interaction between the success of
attackers on maximizing location privacy loss while remaining undetected by different
levels of defender’s suspicion. As well, the final model evaluates a solution for the
optimal strategy for attackers. All the simulations for the models were implemented
in Python.
5.1 Variables
There are numerous variables that the model can control to simulate various sce-
narios of VANETs. Changing these variables can lead to different effects on strategies
each type of vehicle nodes chooses. Variables are tested in the models to analyze pos-
sible trends of the results. The variables tested are described below.
5.1.1 Total Number of Nodes in the VANET
The total number of nodes in the VANET can be adjusted to simulate that of
a real scenario VANET. In order to obtain accurate results with less variability, the
model uses a large number of nodes in the VANET. If the model uses a small number,
the results would contain less data that could be analyzed to determine the effects of
attackers in the system. This number also determines the maximum possible location
privacy for a single node based on formula 4.1.
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5.1.2 Cost of Pseudonym Change
The cost of a pseudonym change occurs anytime a defender node decides to co-
operate in a mix zone. The higher the cost of a pseudonym change, the higher the
chance that a defender node will not cooperate in the system due to the negative
effect of the payout. In the models, the cost of pseudonym change is synonymous
with γ.
5.1.3 Number of Rounds of Mix Zones
The number of rounds of mix zones determines how many instances of mix zones
occur in the simulation. One round represents an instance where a certain number
of vehicle nodes enter a mix zone then exit a mix zone. After every round in a mix
zone, the location privacy for each defender node is reevaluated. A larger set of
rounds provide a better idea of the average interaction between the defenders and the
attackers.
5.1.4 Chance to Enter Mix Zone
The chance to enter the mix zone determines the probability of each individual
node in the VANET to enter the mix zone in a given round. If the chance to enter
the mix zone is 10 percent, then in each round, every vehicle node has a 10 percent
chance to enter the mix zone. In a 50-node network, an average of 5 nodes will enter
the mix zone. However, when analyzing each round individually, the amount of nodes
that enter the mix zone will significantly vary.
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5.1.5 Location Privacy Loss Per Round
The location privacy loss per round represents the location privacy loss function
mentioned in the design phase of the model. Between each round of mix zone in the
simulation, the location privacy of each node in the VANET will decrease linearly by
the specified value. If the location privacy of a node were to decrease below zero after
a round, then the location privacy of that node will remain zero.
5.1.6 Probability Error Adjustment
The probability error adjustment represents a manual adjustment to the expected
probability of cooperation function in order to closer match the actual probability of
cooperation adjustment in the simulations. This value depends on all other variables
and is calculated and adjusted over simulations. It allows the average difference of
the expected probability of cooperation and the actual probability of cooperation to
be zero.
5.1.7 Minimum Number of Nodes that Enter a Mix Zone
The minimum number of nodes entering a mix zone represents the specified
amount of nodes for a round of a mix zone to be valid. This number is used in
order to mitigate the skewed data that comes from the logistic functions utilized for
small amount of nodes.
5.2 Initial Selfish Defense Node Model
In order to start creating a model inclusive of attackers, the first implementation
is to create the initial model showing how defender nodes interact with each other
based on the selfish nature of vehicles for mix zones. The goal of this model is to
40
determine whether or not a defender vehicle will cooperate or defect depending on
the current state of certain variables.
The dynamic variables for this model include:
• The total number of nodes in the VANET
• The number of nodes that enter the mix zone
• The current location privacy of the defender node
• The cost to switch pseudonyms
Based on these variables, the model calculates the defender payoff is in formula 5.1
based on the expected probability of cooperation. If that value is positive, then the
model will output the fact that the defender node would cooperate in the mix zone.
If the value is negative, then the model will output the fact the defender node would
defect in the mix zone.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the interaction among all of these variables to produce
a chart showing when a defender would choose to cooperate versus defect as the
defender’s strategy. If the current location privacy of the defender node is in the green
area based on the y axis, then the defender would choose the cooperative strategy.
If the current location privacy of the defender node is in the red area based on the
y axis, then the defender would choose the defecting strategy. If the max location
privacy possible is approximately 5.64, with the cost of the pseudonym change being
0.3, the maximum possible location privacy that could be obtained from cooperating
would be 5.34. In an observation, there are certain amount of nodes, specifically low
amounts, in a mix zone where a defender node would never cooperate because the
location privacy gained after the mix zone would be zero.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates a similar concept but with a cost of pseudonym change
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Figure 5.1: Graph of Defender Strategy in a 50 Vehicle Node Network
with γ = 0.3
value of 1.0. Because the cost of changing a pseudonym is higher than the previous
chart, there is a larger amount of area where a defender node would defect because
of less benefit from a mix zone
5.3 Initial Selfish Defense Node Model With Attacker Nodes
Since the basic self defense node model has been established, the next step in
implementation is to introduce an attacker nodes into the system. The goal of the
model is to determine whether or not an attacker would cooperate or defect , giving
the variables defined from the previous model. Based on these variables, the attacker
obtains the payoff of the difference in expected location privacy for all defender nodes
between if the attacker would have cooperated and if the attacker would have defected.
If this payoff is positive, then the attacker would defect. If this payoff is negative,
then the attack would cooperate.
In Figure 5.3, the expected total location privacy loss when a single attacker was
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Figure 5.2: Graph of Defender Strategy in a 50 Vehicle Node Network
with γ = 1.0
included on the selfish defense model is described. The displayed graph shows that
the expected total location privacy loss is positive across all quantity of nodes that
enter the mix zone. It means that for all instances of number of nodes that enter
the mix zone, the attacker has no reason to choose any other strategy than to defect.
In this particular graph, the maximum value of total privacy loss occurs with a low
amount of nodes entering the mix zone.
In Figure 5.4, the number of attackers increases from one to three. What can be
observed is that the total location privacy loss increases than that of a single attacker
assuming that all three attackers decide to defect. Similar to the previous graph of
the single attacker, the total location privacy loss remains positive for all iterations
of the number of nodes that enter the mix zone. However, there is a slight difference
in the peak of the graph. The maximum of total location privacy loss occurs at 16
nodes entering the mix zone rather than at the beginning numeral values of nodes.
The main take-away from these two charts is that an attacker has no reason to
ever not defect as the strategy. As a result, it leads into understanding a reasoning
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Figure 5.3: Chart of Expected Total Location Privacy Loss in a 50 Vehicle
Node Network with 1 Attacker with γ = 0.3
for why an attacker would cooperate. An attacker may cooperate if there is a risk
of being detected. This finding will be evaluated further in the implementations of
simulations.
5.4 Selfish Defense Node Simulations without Probability Error
Correction
With modeling how selfish defender nodes should cooperate and defect under
specific conditions, the next goal in implementation is to run simulations of the game
scenarios with the design model made previously. In addition to the variables used in
the original model, there are some more variables needed in order to more accurately
simulate the scenario closer to a real life VANET scenario.
The following are the dynamic variables used for the simulation:
• The total number of nodes in the VANET
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Figure 5.4: Chart of Expected Total Location Privacy Loss in a 50 Vehicle
Node Network with 3 Attackers with γ = 0.3
• The minimum number of nodes that enters a mix zone
• The number of rounds of mix zone
• The cost to switch pseudonyms
• The chance to enter the mix zone
• The location privacy loss per round
The main goal of the first simulation is to evaluate and confirm that the expected
probability of cooperation matches closely with the actual probability of cooperation
which is simulated. In the initial simulation, there are only selfish defender nodes in
the network. Each node starts with a random location privacy between zero and the
maximum location privacy allowed based on the number of nodes in the network. For
each round of the mix zones, each node in the network has whatever set chance to
enter the mix zone. Based off the simulation of chance, there are n nodes that enter
the mix zone per round. Each node in the mix zone evaluates its current location
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privacy. Based off the previous expected model, it determines whether to cooperate
or defect in the mix zone. The payoffs for the cooperating defender nodes are then
updated based on the actual number of nodes that decide to cooperate. Lastly, the
location privacy of all the nodes is decreased by the location privacy loss per round.
This process is repeated in the number of rounds specified by the simulation.
Figure 5.5 describes one simulation of all the selfish defense vehicles model. This
simulation is done over 10,000 rounds of mix zones when γ = 0.3, the chance to enter
the mix zone is 0.1, the constant location privacy loss per round is 0.1, and with 50
vehicle nodes in the network. If the expected probability of cooperation is accurate on
the modeling of the actual probability of cooperation, then the difference in probabil-
ity should approach zero or close to an average of zero per round. However, when we
look at the results from the graph, there is a difference of 210 between the expected
probability and the actual probability of cooperation, where the expected probability
overestimates the actual probability. When considering the average difference per
round, it comes to 0.021 which is equivalent to an average difference of 2.1 percent
per round. It can be considered a significant amount for the large number of rounds
in the simulation. This leads to the need to find a way to correct the difference to
become closer to an average of zero.
In addition to this result, other interesting data the simulation provides is that the
average location privacy of a single node at any given time is approximately 1.23 for
this particular simulation. Over multiple runs of the simulation, the average location
privacy remains around that value with a deviation of about 0.01. An average of 22
percent of the maximum potential location privacy is held by a node at a time. This
is considered a relatively low amount.
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Figure 5.5: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation without Probability Error Adjustment in a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with No Attackers
5.5 Selfish Defense Node Simulations with Probability Error
Correction
An important aspect to examine is that defender nodes do not have any knowledge
of the current location privacy level of other nodes. However, that location privacy
level is personally taken into account when conducting whether or not to cooperate in
a mix zone. Since local location privacy is taken into account in the strategy but not
in the predictive model, the predictive model overestimates the actual cooperation
rate. To solve this issue, a new model is created to adjust the expected cooperation
probability by utilizing a constant amount to leverage the expected cooperation prob-
ability towards the actual cooperation probability. This probability error is formed
from multiple simulations and from adjusting the error each time by the average prob-
ability difference per round which is formed over multiple iterations. This process is
done until the average probability difference per round is sufficiently close to zero.
47
Figure 5.6 describes the new simulation with the additional probability error ad-
just. After adding the adjustment, the difference in probability only varies between
-15 and 10 over the 10,000 rounds. This equates to a 0.0015 average deviation from
zero per round. In comparison to the previous model, the average location privacy of
a single node at any given time is approximately 1.15. Note that since the error cor-
rection is calculated per simulation with specific variables, changing around variables
will cause discrepancy. As a result, the error correction has to be recalculated. When
examining the average of this over 30 different runs with probability error adjustment,
the average also is considerably closer to zero as shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.6: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation with Probability Error Adjustment in a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with No Attackers
5.6 Adding Attackers to the Simulation that Only Defect
The next step for simulation implementation consists of adding the attackers in the
model and determining how they affect the system. First of all, we have to determine
the effect that the attackers have on the difference in cooperation probability when
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Figure 5.7: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation with Probability Error Adjustment For a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with No Attackers (30 Runs)
they only defect while in the mix zone. From the prior analysis, the strategy made of
only defecting is optimal in maximizing location privacy loss of the system when the
threat of detection is not there. Therefore, with this simulation, it is not as important
to analyze the effect on the location privacy as it is to determine what the maximum
deviation of the difference in probability that occurs from always defecting is.
Upon analyzing a simulation run as shown in figure 5.8, the effect of adding attack-
ers to the system can be clearly seen. There is a clear negative run in the difference
in cooperation probability ending at approximately -82 in difference. Comparing to
the last simulation without attackers, one attacker has made an increased deviation
from a zero average to 0.8. Referring to figure 5.9 and figure 5.10, the number of
attackers has increased to 3 and 5 respectively. In other words, the deviation of the
cooperation probability difference grows even greater.
One of the key aspects showing the change in difference in cooperation probability
is to show that attackers cause a significant and visible difference in a VANET. As
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a result, if attackers are not cautious in their strategy, the noise that they cause can
make defenders become wary of an anomaly.
Table 5.1: Cooperation Probability Difference for 0, 1, 3 and 5 Attackers
in a 50 Vehicle Node Network





When the values for the quantity of attackers are compared as shown in Table
5.1, the deviation increase is easily recognizable. Based off these numbers, the model
can start to incorporate suspicions levels into the defender nodes. Suspicion levels
can be defined as detecting anomaly or possible attackers in the system based on the
deviation from the zero average in cooperation probability difference. Three different
levels are arbitrary defined as shown below in Table 5.2 . They are defined by the
severity of suspicion levels.
Table 5.2: Defined Defender Suspicion Levels for Final Simulation




Taking the values in the Table 5.2 to analyze with those in Table 5.1, the results
are as follows:
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• A highly suspicious group of defensive nodes would be able to detect a single
attacker who always defect
• A medium suspicious group of defensive nodes would be able to detect when
three attackers who always defect
• A low suspicion group of defensive nodes would be able to detect when five
attackers who always defect
Based on the results above, in order to balance out, it is important for attackers to
mix up their strategy rather than always defect.
Figure 5.8: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation with Probability Error Adjustment in a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with 1 Attacker
5.7 Final Simulation: Attackers that Remain Undetected while Maxi-
mizing Location Privacy Loss
The final simulation takes into account all other simulations that have been built
up to this point. The addition to this final simulation is that there is an analysis on
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Figure 5.9: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation with Probability Error Adjustment in a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with 3 Attackers
the attackers’ success for not being detected based on Table 5.2. Additional analysis
is done as well on the total location privacy loss of the system. Both of them are done
for different percentage values for the rate of defect, where that percentage represents
the chance for the attacker to defect when it is inside a mix zone. Finally, the model
calculates an optimal strategy for the defect rate of the attacker and evaluates the
affect of using that defect rate.
The optimization for this simulation is for the attacker to minimize the location
privacy of the system while maximizing remaining undetected in the network. From
the final game model in the design portion, the attacker achieves this by maximizing
the payoff that the attacker can achieve. The difference in the optimization from the
model is that the attacker also optimizes its strategy between cooperate and defect
in order to achieve maximizing payoff.
This equation is expanded as follows from equation 4.7:
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Figure 5.10: Graph of Difference of Expected and Actual Probability of
Cooperation with Probability Error Adjustment in a 50 Vehicle Node
Network with 5 Attackers
TLPL = [(n− a) ∗ (LPn − LPn−a)−D] ∗ (1− q) (5.1)
Referring back to equation 4.7, in addition, q represents the probability of choosing
the cooperate strategy and 1−q thus represents the probability of choosing the defect
strategy. There is no representation of the cooperate strategy here as the payoff for
choosing that is zero. From this equation 5.1, an attacker should maximize its defect
rate without D, the possible detection penalty maximizing. For this particular model,
D can maximize to (n−a)∗(LPn−LPn−a) resulting to a TLPL = 0 when maximized.
The equation for D is as follows:
D = [(n− a) ∗ (LPn − LPn−a)] ∗ [log10(10 ∗ (1− q))] (5.2)
Examining these equations 5.1 and 5.2, these equations are combined to obtain
an equation to maximize these requirements. The equation is as follows:
(1− log10(10 ∗ (1− q)) ∗ (1− q) (5.3)
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Table 5.3: Constant Values Used in the Final Simulation
Variable Value
The total number of nodes in the VANET 50
The minimum number of nodes that enter a mix zone 5
The number of rounds of mix zones 10,000
The cost to switch pseudonyms 0.3
The chance to enter the mix zone 0.1
The location privacy loss per round 0.1
When finding the maximum point of this equation, it equates to a cooperation
rate for the attacker of approximately 63 percent. That means that the supposed op-
timal defect rate for an attacker for maximizing location privacy loss and minimizing
detecting is approximately 37 percent.
The results provided in the following graphs have the following constant values
used in the simulations provided in Table 5.3.
Furthermore, each simulation of 10,000 mix zone rounds is ran 100 times in order
to gather sufficient data. The following graphs in Figure 5.11, Figure 5.12, and
Figure 5.13 demonstrate the percentage of undetected simulations for a given defect
rate, suspicion level, and number of attackers.
The following graph in Figure 5.14 demonstrates the average total location privacy
loss for a given defect rate and number of attackers.
Last, the simulation is ran under the supposed optimal defect rate of 37 percent.
Running the simulation 100 times yields the following average effect of attackers in
the system as a whole over 10,000 rounds in Table 5.4.
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Figure 5.11: Graph of Successful Undetected Simulations Rate for At-
tackers for Different Defect Rates in a 50 Vehicle Node Network with 1
Attacker
Table 5.4: Effect of 1, 3 and 5 Attackers on Location Privacy with Optimal
Defect Rate of 0.37 in a 50 Vehicle Node Network




5.8 Final Formal Game Model
With the results of the attacker’s optimal strategy, the formal game model from
the design section (Figure 4.4) can be expanded to include the mixed strategy values
for the attacker. While the values of q are solved, the payoffs are still dependent on
the n vehicles in the mix zone at the time as well as the number of vehicles that decide
to cooperate. The basic model of the optimal strategy through the implementations
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Figure 5.12: Graph of Successful Undetected Simulations Rate for At-
tackers for Different Defect Rates in a 50 Vehicle Node Network with 3
Attackers
previously are described in Figure 5.15. Since all of the possible scenarios of the
combination of vehicles in a network that enter a network and the strategy each
vehicle decides varies across each round, the model keeps the payoffs as variables
from the design.
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Figure 5.13: Graph of Successful Undetected Simulations Rate for At-
tackers for Different Defect Rates in a 50 Vehicle Node Network with 5
Attackers
Figure 5.14: Total Location Privacy Loss Caused by Attackers in the Entire
Network in a 50 Vehicle Node Network Averaged Over 100 Simulations
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Figure 5.15: Formal Game Model for Defenders and Attackers. Formal
Game Model for Defenders and Attackers. 2-player Game with Cooper-
ate and Defect Strategies for Both Attackers and Defenders and Their
Corresponding Payoffs. Includes Optimal Mixed Strategy for Attackers of




This chapter discusses the most significant results that were obtained from the
implementation and simulation of the models.
6.1 Analysis of Detection Algorithm
The use the expected probability of cooperation deviation provides an excellent
way to propose a way for defending vehicles to monitor the VANET system. From the
results, it is clear that higher percentages of defect rates severely impacts the success
rate of attackers remaining undetected. As the number of attackers increase inside a
system, it becomes much harder for them to stay undetected at a higher defect rate.
For a group of defenders who have a low level of suspicion (a 2 percent deviation
from zero in expected cooperation probability), a single attacker or three attackers
could defect every single time and maintain a very high success rate on remaining
undetected. Although when 10 percent of the VANET is filled with attackers, the
results show that the attackers are most likely to be undetected even at a 80 percent
defect rate. In a network where the nodes may be more wary of possibly malicious
behavior that represents high suspicion, the success of staying undetected doesn’t be-
come viable unless you have a 60 percent or lower defect rate. Overall, the possibility
of the nodes having different levels of suspicion can play a huge role in the attackers’
choice of strategy.
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6.2 Analysis of Maximizing the Total Location Privacy Loss
As mentioned previously and supported by the results, higher levels of defect
rate will provide the maximum payoff for attackers if they do not care about being
detected. However, when the goal of remaining undetected becomes a necessity for
the attackers, they have to consider the previous results from the detection algorithm
in order to maintain the highest level of being undetected while still maximizing the
amount of location privacy loss they obtain. Looking at the results, it seems that
one of the best strategies is to maintain a defect rate that has close to 100 percent
success in being undetected. If an attacker has access to know the suspicion level
and current deviation of probability, the attacker could manipulate the defect rate,
depending on the current scenario, in order to maintain high level of location privacy
loss while staying undetected.
6.3 Effect of Attackers on the System as a Whole
When taking into account how these types of internal attacking vehicles effect the
location privacy as a whole, the results show that the overall location privacy loss
accounts for 0.6 to 3 percent of the total location privacy gained by the defenders. It is
fairly significant when looking at numerous rounds of mix zones in large portions and
find that such decrease of 0.6 to 3 percent impacts every normal user in the network.
Another important statistic to take note of is that for every time an attacker defects
in a mix zone, it generally takes away 12 percent of the location privacy that could
have been gained if the attacker would have cooperated.
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6.4 The Optimal Attacker Strategy
When looking at the calculated value of 37% for the defect rate for an attacker,
there are many elements that the defect rate can not consider. First, the punishment
of detection for an attacker can vary in necessity. If an attacker wants to guarantee
never being detected by the defenders, the design for payoffs becomes extremely hard
to solve for this game. This is because of the random nature of VANETs with mix
zones and the uncertainty of what will occur in one round. Most of the design for the
game comes from predictive formulas for the behaviors of vehicle nodes in the system.
The predictive formulas can only analyze information that are available to all nodes
where as the actual decisions that nodes make may use additional information at their
disposal like current personal location privacy. Because of the difference in predictive
and actual decision models, there would be no way to guarantee being undetected
based on variance.
Looking at the graphs from the final model, seeing that the undetected success rate
only starts ”looking” guaranteed once the defect rate hits 50% or lower, this coincides
with how the 37% defect rate is calculated to be optimal. The formula for calculating
the optimal defect rate based on detection penalty is based on keeping the variance
of suspicion as close to zero as possible. If an attacker would be able to determine the
amount of variance in difference in probability of expected cooperation with actual
probability that defenders have before they are suspicious, then the optimal defect
rate would be able to increase. Along with this, if the attackers define the cost of




This chapter discusses some possible researches om the future that could expand
the concepts discussed in this thesis in order to enhance security in VANETs.
7.1 Continued Research On Threat Models On Mix Zones
Previous research on mix zones have identified adversarial threats based on eaves-
dropping stations in attempt to track locations of vehicles even after the vehicles
switch their pseudonyms through mix zones. This thesis has identified the potential
attack surface of an undetectable attacker vehicle which has blended in with other
selfish vehicles. Continuing research to find more attack surfaces on mix zones or
VANETs will help to further understand the impact of each attack on the system and
to create defenses for those high severity attacks.
7.2 Continued Research On Detection Methods
As described in this thesis, one possible way to detect a malicious activity is
to monitor the predictive model for any abnormal deviation from what is expected.
Further research could analyze what types of information from broadcasts and from
vehicles we can monitor to determine whether or not someone in the system is trying
to act in a malicious manner. The more detection methods we can use, the more
enhanced the VANET security will be in terms of monitoring the system real-time for
any threats and being able to mitigate any critical threats from occurring later on.
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7.3 Implementing the Model on a Real Life System
To further test the validity of the model and the implementation concepts on real
vehicles in a VANET can help solidify evidence of possible real world attack surfaces.
Along this, expanded scaling of the model to encompass a bigger network can help




Ensuring that security research is being upheld for a technologically advancing
field like VANETs is extremely important in order maintain the privacy and safety of
society. This thesis talks about the potential attack surface of an internal adversarial
vehicle within a build security environment of mix zones.
Using past research on how mix zones have been modeled based on game theory,
the paper presents its own model and implementation of an attacker vehicle that
intends to maximize the amount of location privacy loss.
From the results that were found through the analysis, there is strong evidence
that these internal attacker vehicles can have a significant impact on decreasing the
location privacy of a VANET, even with a small number of attackers. As mix zones
often support very large vehicle networks, it is important that there is a way to
determine whether there is malicious adversarial action occurring in a mix zone.
Overall, this thesis helps modeling and evaluating an attack surface for which
future security research can establish defenses in order to maintain the safety and
privacy of the drivers and passengers in VANETs.
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